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The experienced speed of the passage of time is not constant as time can seem to ﬂy or
slow down depending on the circumstances we are in. Anecdotally accidents and other
frightening events are extreme examples of the latter; people who have survived acci-
dents often report altered phenomenology including how everything appeared to happen
in slow motion. While the experienced phenomenology has been investigated, there are
no explanations about how one can have these experiences. Instead, the only recently dis-
cussed explanation suggests that the anecdotal phenomenology is due to memory effects
and hence not really experienced during the accidents. The purpose of this article is (i) to
reintroduce the currently forgotten comprehensively altered phenomenology that some
people experience during the accidents, (ii) to explain why the recent experiments fail to
address the issue at hand, and (iii) to suggest a new framework to explain what happens
when people report having experiences of time slowing down in these cases. According to
the suggested framework, our cognitive processes become rapidly enhanced. As a result,
the relation between the temporal properties of events in the external world and in internal
states becomes distorted with the consequence of external world appearing to slow down.
That is, the presented solution is a realist one in a sense that it maintains that sometimes
people really do have experiences of time slowing down.
Keywords: perception, consciousness, the passage of time, phenomenology, temporal illusions
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the experiences that people anecdotally have
had during frightening events and especially on how to account
for the altered phenomenology in those events. The main interest
lies on the experience of time slowing down, which is the most
frequently reported case of altered phenomenology during the
accidents. This temporal distortion is a fundamental one because
it concerns our sense of time passing when experiences ﬂow from
one to another, which is at the very heart of the stream of con-
sciousness, and it concerns the perception of all stimuli alike, not
merely some particular sensory system.
In more detail, the paper has three interrelated objectives. The
ﬁrst one is to describe some of the relevant features of those expe-
riences and situations where people have claimed that time slowed
down for them. Understanding both the phenomenology and the
situation where such distortions (allegedly) occur is important,
for the experiences people report having during accidents are not
conﬁned to the phenomenology of time slowing. Hence, time
distortions do not constitute the whole explanandum.
The second objective is to argue that the described phe-
nomenology really occurs during accidents. This will be done
by showing how the two recently presented alternative expla-
nations of the phenomenon, both presented in Stetson et al.
(2007), are unsatisfactory. The issue at stake here is important
for the reason that it is intimately tied to the question whether
the speed of the passage of time, the ﬂow of the stream of
consciousness, is ever really experienced. Presumably, if it is
not experienced even in these often-referred anecdotal cases,
then it becomes doubtful whether it is experienced in normal
situations either. This result, in turn, would have signiﬁcant
consequences for the theories of time consciousness, many of
which posit that we have the experiences of the passage of time
(for old but still relevant theories, see Husserl, 1991; James,
1890, for more recent discussions see Dainton, 2000; Lloyd,
2002).
Finally, after arguing that there are good reasons to accept peo-
ples’ reports of time slowing down during accidents, the third
objective is to provide a phenomenally and empirically plausible
account of the described experiences. To this end, the shortcom-
ings of the discussed theories are also useful as they point toward a
possible solution that will be presented in the ﬁnal section. There
is indeed a need for such theory, since apart from the rejected
explanation and (possibly) related explanations concerning per-
formances in various duration estimation tasks, we currently have
no theory to account for the phenomenology of these experiences.
In short, the proposed theory is that the experiences of time slow-
ing down are related to the increased speed of internal processes:
when we become faster, the world appears slower to us. It is fur-
thermore hypothesized that our faster internal processes are due
to locus coeruleus norepinephrine system,whose activity increases
in frightening accidents, and that our sense of normal speed of
external events adapts to the prevailing conditions, which is why
we have experiences of the time slowing down only in unusual
circumstances.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME SLOWING DOWN
The ﬁrst detailed characterization of the experiences in question
comes from geologist Albert von St. Gallen Heim (translated in
Noyes and Kletti, 1972). In the Yearbook of the Swiss Alpine Club
1892, Heim wrote that nearly 95% of climbers, who reported their
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experiences during an accidental fall to him,had had an experience
that in part included
a dominant mental quickness and sense of surety. Mental
activity became enormous, rising to a 100-fold velocity or
intensity. The relationships of events and their probable out-
comes were overviewed with objective clarity. No confusion
entered at all. Time became greatly expanded. The individ-
ual acted with lightning-quickness in accord with accurate
judgment of his situation. (Noyes andKletti, 1972, pp. 46–47)
The next descriptive, and more systematic, analyses by Noyes and
Kletti (1976, 1977) basically conﬁrmed Heim’s claims. The most
frequently reported features in the survey were an apparent slow-
ing down of external time (75% of 85 participants reported this
in the 1976 study, 72% of 101 participants in the 1977 study)1.
Almost as many subjects reported an increased speed of thoughts
(68 vs. 61%). A 14-year-old boy who had accidentally shot himself
in the chest, for example, reported that his “thoughts were speeded
up and time seemed stretched out” (Noyes and Kletti, 1976, p. 22).
For some, the experience of time slowing down was even so strong
that“time stood still”(Noyes andKletti, 1976,p. 21).As a summary
of these two features, they write:
Not only did elapsed time seem drawn out, but events seemed
tohappen in slowmotion.Yet in contrast to the outward slow-
ing, individuals described their thoughts as speeded up and
expressed amazement at the number of thoughts or men-
tal images that passed through their minds in a matter of
seconds. These two aspects of the experience of time were
generally described together and were clearly related to one
another. (Noyes and Kletti, 1976, p. 23)
Furthermore, many of Noyes and Kletti’s subjects reported hav-
ing acted fast and purposefully combined with increased focused
attention and alertness that were also present in Heim’s character-
ization. For instance, a 19-year-old climber reported that during
his fall, the fear and hope of survival “forced a concentration of
my thoughts on rescue efforts and a redirection of my whole mind
onto whatever might be necessary to prevent the potential plunge”
(Noyes and Kletti, 1976, p. 23). Similarly, a jet pilot during the
Vietnam War showed the same increased attention and alertness
to actions needed to save his life when his jet was improperly
launched:
. . . when the nose-wheel strut collapsed I vividly recalled, in a
matter of about 3 s, over a dozen actions necessary to success-
ful recovery of ﬂight attitude. The procedures I needed were
readily available. I had almost total recall and felt in complete
1It should be mentioned that the phenomenology that St. Gallen Heim, Noyes, and
Kletti describe is similar to that reported in near-death experience studies. Greyson
and Stevenson (1980) for example found that 79% of the respondents in the near-
death study had had anomalous temporal phenomenology. Direct comparison of
the studies is impossible, however, for two reasons. First, near-death studies are often
less explicit about the altered phenomenology in general and focus more on changes
on attitudes and religious experiences. Second, the subject populations that provide
the reports are very different. For example, while the subjects in Noyes and Kletti’s
studies had been conscious during the experiences, 40% of Greyson and Stevenson
subjects had been on such a bad condition that they had been considered dead
during the near-death experience.
control. I seemed to be doing everything that I could and
doing it properly. (Noyes and Kletti, 1976, p. 24)
To summarize, the key features of the experiences that are of
interest here are the following:
1. The feeling of external time expanding and slowing down to a
great extent.
2. Dominant mental quickness as demonstrated by the increased
speed of thoughts.
3. There is often an altered sense of the duration of the event
lasting longer than it actually does.
4. If possible, in the event in question, people often act fast and
purposefully.
5. In the latter case, their attention is also altered and narrowly
focused on the issues relevant for survival.
6. Unusually sharp vision or hearing.
It is important to notice that experiences having these features
occur only in exceptional situations because this kind of experi-
ence is a “normal reaction to suddenly presented, life-threatening
danger” (Noyes and Kletti, 1976, p. 26). Thus one relevant fac-
tor for triggering these experiences appears to be the belief in
imminent death – the experiences are more probable if a subject
believes that she is in a fatal situation. Indeed, in Noyes and Kletti’s
(1976) survey, 80% of the subjects (N = 59) who believed that
death was imminent reported experiences of time slowing down,
whereas such experience was reported only by 65% of the subjects
(N = 26) who did not believe death was imminent [in 1977 study,
the percentages were 78 (N = 59) and 63 (N = 42)]. An even more
important factor is that the event is surprising, since Noyes and
Kletti argue that hospital patients facing a threatening situation
due to their illness do not report an increased speed of thoughts
and altered attention. Heim, in turn, also referred to both factors
as he mentioned that people who have had these experiences can
be completely paralyzed in less surprising and/or less dangerous
situations. Given the phenomenology of the experiences and the
knowledge of the typical situations in which they can occur, how
can we investigate and explain these experiences?
RECENT INVESTIGATION OF THE EXPERIENCES DURING
FRIGHTENING EVENTS
Two recent and different lines of research concern temporal fea-
tures of the phenomenology in question. One of them relates to
the ﬁrst listed key feature (the feeling of external time expanding),
whereas the other relates to the third feature (the altered sense of
duration). While the ﬁrst feature is the main topic of this paper, let
us begin with the latter line of research. One motivation to do so
is to clarify the difference between the two features. There is need
for such because the ﬁrst and third key features of the phenom-
enology both concern temporal phenomena and the expression
“time slows down” has been used in relation to both of them.
Accordingly, one might think that these two features boil down to
the same phenomenon in the ﬁnal analysis. Yet, a closer inspec-
tion of the both features illustrates that the expression “time slows
down”has a different meaning in these two contexts and that such
conclusion is unwarranted.
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The ﬁrst key feature concerns the subjective feeling of the pas-
sage of time – whether it goes fast or slow. Here the feeling of time
slowing down could be, for example, a consequence of a distorted
phenomenology:when themovementwe perceive happens in slow
motion, we have the feeling that time slows down. When reading
the subjective reports, this expansion of time appears to be quite
substantial for subjects – a few seconds,might for example feel like
5 min (Noyes and Kletti, 1977, p. 376). Although such reports are
common, literally taken this 100-fold expansion of time is rather
unbelievable. Hence some skepticism toward such reports is war-
ranted. This does not mean that they should be merely dismissed
though. Rather, they should be taken as a sign of such remark-
able change in the phenomenology that one has difﬁculties in
making duration estimations. In this paper, the expression “time
slows down” is used in this sense that refers to changes in one’s
phenomenology of time passing by2.
The third key feature concerns the explicit cognition of the
duration of passed time. It concerns duration estimation (also
called duration or interval perception) – our performance in vari-
ous tasks such as prospective and retrospective interval estimation
tasks, interval production and reproduction tasks, and temporal
bisection tasks. In these studies, “time slowing down” refers to the
overestimation of the duration of stimuli.
Time slowing down understood in this sense is often explained
by the means of an (hypothetical) internal clock (e.g., Gibbon,
1977; Treisman et al., 1990; Wearden, 1991). The idea is that when
the speed of this clock is increased, more ticks occur during the
measured interval. As more ticks means longer duration, subjects
overestimate the duration in question. In such cases, subjects may
estimate that something lasted, say, 5 s although in reality it lasted
only 4 s – a 4 s interval slowed down in a sense to a 5 s interval.
While there has been little empirical research on the phenom-
enology of time passing by, there is a considerable amount of
research on our performance in various duration estimation tasks.
Thus, if the two usages of “time slows down” would be the same,
or if they would be different sides of the same phenomenon (one
focusing the phenomenology and the other concerning perfor-
mance in tasks), there would in fact be a number of studies on
the matter already. For example, it has been found that fear is
associated with time slowing down in duration estimation studies
(Campbell and Bryant, 2007) and that threat causes subjects to
overestimate durations (e.g., Anderson et al., 2007). Furthermore,
some of the studies on performance in time perception tasks using
pictures or video of a threatening situation even use the expres-
sion“time slows down”in their titles (Loftus et al., 1987; Bar-Haim
et al., 2010).
2This usage is close to the frustrating feeling that time moves slowly, drags, when
we are bored. The phenomena that are behind these two are different however. One
difference between these two phenomena is that in the latter case the feeling of time
dragging, moving slowly, evolves slowly whereas it happens almost immediately in
the phenomenon we are interested in. Second, when we are bored we do not really
experience time slowing down in a sense that things move in slow motion, whereas
this is what people report they experience during accidents. Third, when people are
bored, they still do not report any altered (or at least increased) speed of thoughts
and attention. Accordingly, there are good reasons to separate the experience of time
moving slowly when we are bored from the phenomenon discussed here.
Despite these possible similarities, the studies on the perfor-
mance in duration estimation tasks need to be separated from
the passage of time judgments and therefore they can provide
only little help in addressing the topic of this paper. To begin
with, our duration estimations and the passage of time judgments
can change independently of each other (Wearden, 2008). Hence
duration estimations can be at best only indirect measures of the
phenomenology of time passing by. Stated more generally, because
the mentioned studies only concern our performance on the dura-
tion estimation tasks, they do not address the issue of the distorted
phenomenology and consequently can only (at best) provide us
information on the third key feature, leaving others unanalyzed.
This conclusion is emphasized by the fact that the duration over-
estimation results are explained by means of an internal clock
without any reference to the phenomenology of time slowing
down and other distorted phenomenology. Thus it remains an
open question why speeding of an internal clock would bring
about, say, an unusually sharp hearing.
Second, the two phenomena are often of different magnitude.
In duration estimation studies, the idea that time slows down fol-
lows from the fact that the duration of stimuli is overestimated
often by 10–50%. In the cases that Noyes and Kletti describe, time
appears to slow down a 100-fold. This difference in magnitude
suggests that the internal clock metaphor cannot be the sole expla-
nation for time slowing down in the phenomenological sense used
in this paper.
Finally, it is not obvious how much we can justiﬁably conclude
even from the duration estimation studies mentioned above that
appear to be most related to the topic at hand – after all they
investigated time slowing down in response to threatening stim-
uli. One reason for skepticism is that the duration to be judged was
much longer than in those that Noyes and Kletti describe ranging
from a half minute (Loftus et al., 1987) to half an hour (Campbell
and Bryant, 2007), which in turn makes it likely that they inves-
tigate somewhat different phenomena. Likewise, in these studies
the stimuli were presented many times and under controlled con-
ditions. Therefore, the situations were unlikely to match with
Noyes and Kletti’s observation that their explanandum occurred
in surprising and life-threatening situations.
Taken together, the listed reasons make it safe to say that the
studies on the performance in duration estimation tasks cannot
shed much light on the issues at hand, even if there is a connection,
possibly a close one, between them and the subjective feeling of
the passage of time. Accordingly, the vast amount of research on
duration estimation, even when it relates to threatening situations,
will be largely ignored here.
There is, however, a recent study by Stetson et al. (2007) that
is more directly pertinent to the issues at hand. In this study, the
idea of people experiencing that time slows down during a fright-
ening event is introduced with a motion picture analogy: when a
movie runs slower than it was ﬁlmed, things in it appear to hap-
pen slowly. What makes this idea tempting is that it readily ﬁts
with the reports of how time in the external world appears to slow
down and thus the authors’ approach to time slowing down is the
same as the phenomenological one used here. One of Noyes and
Kletti’s subjects, who narrowly escaped a collision with a train, for
example said that “as the train went by I saw the engineer’s face.
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It was like a movie run slowly so the frames progress with a jerky
motion. That was how I saw his face” (Noyes and Kletti, 1977, p.
377). In line with such reports, Stetson et al. (2007) argue that the
slow motion of time“should entail consequences such as an ability
to perceive things with higher temporal resolution. For example,
watching a hummingbird in video slow motion allows ﬁner tem-
poral discrimination upon replay at normal speed because more
snapshots are taken of the rapidly beating wings.”
To test this hypothesis, the authors conducted an experiment
where subjects’ temporal resolution was measured under normal
and frightening conditions. The normal condition here refers to
casual non-frightening conditions whereas in the frightening con-
dition the subjects “were released from the top of the tower and
experienced free fall for 2.49 s before landing safely in a net” (Stet-
son et al., 2007). The threshold for temporal resolution in turn
was measured with two ﬂickering stimuli (a digit and its nega-
tive image) and the subjects’ task was to separate them from each
other in both conditions. What they found was that the subjects’
temporal resolution did not improve when they faced a frighten-
ing situation. That is, the number of “snapshots” did not increase
during the fall.
In addition to this task, some of the subjects were asked to
estimate the duration of the fall twice. In the ﬁrst time, they had
seen someone else falling and they were then asked to estimate the
fall’s duration by imagining themselves being in the position of
the falling person. The second estimation was based on the recol-
lection of their own fall. What the authors found was that under
the latter conditions the duration estimations were 36% longer.
Basedon their results, the authors concluded that although time
appears to slow down during frightening events – the increase in
the duration estimations illustrates how time becomes expanded
similarly to what people report that they have experienced during
accidents – this is not due to perception because the temporal res-
olution did not improve. Rather, they end their article by arguing
that this is due to memory effects:
. . . we speculate that the involvement of the amygdala in
emotional memory may lead to dilated duration judgments
retrospectively, due to a richer, and perhaps secondary encod-
ing of the memories. Upon later readout, such highly salient
events may be erroneously interpreted to have spanned a
greater period of time. (Stetson et al., 2007)
Stetson et al. (2007) put forward thus two competing explanations
for the anecdotal phenomenology described above. According to
the ﬁrst one, the given reports are truthful and the external world
does indeed appear to move in slow motion. This explanation was
not supported by the evidence however. According to the second
explanation, time slowed down only in the sense related to the
duration estimation tasks. In this case one can wonder about the
validity of the reports given after accidents. The authors’ response
is to acknowledge that such reports are indeed given but explain
the unusual phenomenology by the means of unusual memory
effects. Unfortunately, however, both of these explanations have
their shortcomings: the ﬁrst explanation and the temporal reso-
lution task did not touch upon the issue they were supposed to,
while the latter explanation cannot provide the full picture of the
experiences during the frightening accidents. Or so I argue below.
EXPLANATION BASED ON TEMPORAL RESOLUTION OF
PERCEPTION
What Stetson and colleagues tested was in effect the temporal res-
olution of visual perceptual processes – as separated, for example,
from the issue of how many thoughts we can think in a second
(i.e., are our thoughts speeded or not) – in controlled amusement
park conditions. As such, there are a number of ways to argue that
this study does not in fact look into the phenomenon it was sup-
posed to. To begin with, there is a question whether the free fall can
be counted as surprising or “suddenly presented, life-threatening
danger” during which Heim, and Noyes and Kletti argue one can
experience time slowing down. For example, all those participants
that estimated the duration of the fall had seen the fall before they
experienced it themselves and hence it is not obvious that this sit-
uation would count as surprising for them. If the situation was
not surprising and time slowing down was not experienced, then
what was studied is not what the authors claimed. A natural way
to overcome this objection would be to ask participants directly
whether time slowed down for them or not. Unfortunately the
study did not report that this was done, and hence the question
whether time did slow down remains uncertain.
One can of course argue that the difference in the duration esti-
mations at least suggests that time did slow down, as the authors
appear to think. In light of the earlier discussion on how these two
can come apart, and the fact that the difference in the duration
estimations was only one third (and it is thus of a very differ-
ent scale than the subjects’ reports of time expanding a 100-fold),
it is obvious that this is only an assumption and that can easily
be questioned. Furthermore, it is neither the only nor the most
plausible explanation for the result of dilated duration estimation.
For example, it has been reported that subjects underestimate the
duration of a task they are about to do before they actually do it
(e.g., Byram, 1997; Roy et al., 2005). As the duration of the fall
was shorter in the task where subjects imagined the falling with-
out having yet experienced it in the study, it could be that the
difference simply reﬂects the type of tasks subjects carried out.
In another experiment, where people imagined a second hand of
the clock moving for 15 and 30 s, the duration estimations were
shorter when the clock is imagined to be farther away, i.e., when
the image is smaller (Zäch and Brugger, 2008). This is in good
accordance with the results that smaller stimuli are judged to last
for a shorter duration than larger ones (Xuan et al., 2007). Given
that in Stetson et al.’s study the subjects’perception of the situation
took place from a distance (before they themselves were dropped),
it could have inﬂuenced the subjects’ performance when they were
imagining the fall without actually having had the experience
of it themselves yet. This provides another, empirically justiﬁed
explanation for the results without relying on the idea that people
experienced time slowing down. As a result, the possible lack of
surprise and the existence of competing well-motivated explana-
tions for the difference in the duration estimations together make
the conclusions of the study unwarranted.
In keeping with the main objective of this paper, namely the
question of how to account for the anomalous temporal experi-
ence during sudden and frightening situations, it is important to
notice possibly even more fundamental problems with the study:
the methodology and rationale behind it. As illustrated by the
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quotation above, Stetson et al.’s study is strongly inﬂuenced by the
analogy to movies. Although this makes their rationale initially
tempting, a closer consideration shows it to be problematic.
To begin with, even accepting that the difference in duration
estimation is not due to the reasons discussed, the study only
showed that the threshold for determining ﬂickering stimuli and
duration estimation are not related at least directly. If we accept
Stetson et al.’s claim made in the course of their argumentation
that subjective time is not a single uniﬁed entity, and there are
good reasons to think that this is the case, then it is not obvious
that the temporal resolution task the subjects did is suitable task to
measure whether time slows down or not in the ﬁrst place. Quite
the contrary. Consider for example Holcombe’s (2009) recent sep-
aration of two temporal limits of human visual system. On the one
hand, there are fast limits (around 50ms) that are due to lower-
level visual mechanisms such as ﬁrst-order motion and binding
local elements into global form. On the other hand, there are slow
limits (around 200 ms) that are due to high-levelmechanisms such
as word recognition, higher-order motion, and global form with
color. As Holcombe (2009, p. 219) mentions, “[t]his notion of fast
peripheral processing and slower central processing is an old one.”
What makes this separation signiﬁcant for the topic at hand is
that the threshold for ﬂickering stimuli belongs to the ﬁrst group
consisting of lower-level mechanisms. The altered passage of time,
however, is a general distortion affecting ourperceptions as awhole
(as reﬂected in the described phenomenology). Accordingly, there
does not appear to be any reason to assume that temporal resolu-
tion in the early visual processes improves when the more central
phenomenon of time slowing down occurs. This conclusion is
emphasized by Stetson et al.’s claim that the subjective time is not a
single uniﬁed entity,whichmeans that subjective time is composed
of subcomponents that can change independently of each other.
Second, if the temporal resolution of all of our visual perceptual
processes were speeded up, then we should have more sensations,
snapshots in Stetson et al.’s terminology, than we would have in
normal situations. That is, sensations would follow each other
faster than they normally do and in this sense we would see more
during frightening events. Yet because the authors did not make
any claims regarding the general improvement of our cognitive
faculties, we would face more information than we can comfort-
ably comprehend. Accordingly, rather than expecting the external
world to appear to slowdown,onewould expect that in these kinds
of situations time appears to go faster than normally. An analo-
gous example for this would be modern (action) movies where the
editing is done so that one scene is shown only for a brief moment.
Here too, we are facing too much information and it is we who
appear to be slow, trying to apprehend the images that follow each
other too fast. Consequently, it appears that if the temporal resolu-
tion of perceptual processes were a factor in the experience of time
slowing down, then contra Stetson et al., it should not improve but
degrade when time slows down. As a result, even if we assume for
the sake of argument that time slowed down for Stetson et al.’s
subjects, it is only to be expected that the authors did not ﬁnd any
improvement in the temporal resolution during the fall.
One could obviously counter this objection by arguing that
we have experiences of time slowing down because improvements
in temporal resolution mirror the overall enhancement in neural
processing, not only in the mechanisms of visual perception. Tem-
poral resolution improvement understood in this way makes more
sense: not only would our sensory systems provide us with more
information but we would also be able to grasp this new informa-
tion because our attention and other processes would be speeded
up as well. While this is true, and a view resembling this will
be sketched below, this does not help Stetson and his colleagues
because the explanatory work in this alternative understanding
of improved temporal resolution is done by our cognitive abili-
ties – the capacity that determines whether we can grasp what we
see faster than usual. This means that the temporal resolution of
visual perception that Stetson et al. tested need not improve at
all and for this reason the experiment was misguided. Given the
problems with the rationale and methodology of the study and
the results, it is clear that the improved temporal resolution for
early visual perception cannot account for the experiences of time
slowing down. Be that as it may, is it possible that a memory based
account would fare better?
EXPLANATION BASED ON MEMORY EFFECTS
The memory account postulates that time appears to slow down
because richer than usual memories are later erroneously inter-
preted to have spanned a greater period of time than the experience
on which they are based actually did. To be fair to the authors it
must be noted that they present this idea only brieﬂy and in an
almost sketch-like manner. However, the proposal is still worth
elaborating on, as it can illustrate the consequences of not taking
the reported phenomenology as a whole seriously.
To begin, the idea that our experience of time passing slowly
would be due to richer memories and their possible secondary
encoding is at odds with the fact that in Noyes and Kletti’s (1976)
study more than two thirds of the subjects reported an increased
speed of thought. The increased speed of thought, if one reads the
reports, can only refer to the idea that they had far more thoughts
in a short time than they normally would – if our thoughts run
faster than normally, then we can think more thoughts in that time
than normally. The reason the memory account is at odds with the
reports of an increased speed of thought is that because the real
duration did not alter, the number of thoughts people have during
the event would be the same regardless of the truth of memory
account and hence the reports of an increased speed of thought
remains unexplained. In fact, one could even argue that the sit-
uation is even worse because in these cases one should actually
report that the speed of their thoughts was decreased (the num-
ber of thoughts remain the same but the subjects overestimate the
durationof the event). Therefore, the phenomenology of increased
speed of thought does not conform with the memory account.
Itmight be possible to resolve this discrepancywithin themem-
ory account by arguing that our memories of the event include
many fabricated memories of thoughts. Although this possibility
cannot be ruled out, it is still inadequate. First, while it is clear why
memories would be particularly rich and strong (accidents are,
after all, psychologically exceptional situations), this explanation
does not provide any explanation for why such a massive fabrica-
tion of thoughts would take place – the reports of increased speed
of thoughts are almost as common as reports of altered passage of
time (68 vs. 75% according to Noyes and Kletti, 1976). Second, the
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idea of the fabrication of thoughts also fails to explain the fact that
sometimes these thoughts have had causal relevance. Heim, for
example, points out that under the conditions we are discussing
here, people often “act on the basis of completely conscious, sus-
tained, and complicated series of thoughts that are clear in every
respect and often incredibly rapid (Noyes and Kletti, 1972, p. 48).”
Their actions are not simple reﬂexes as the discussion in the second
section illustrated. Given that inmany cases peoplewould not have
survived if they had not acted purposefully, and that they could
not have carried out such actions without an increased speed of
thought, it appears likely that their speed of thought was indeed
increased for a moment and the reports of it are not simply due to
fabricated memories.
Another general shortcoming in Stetson and his colleagues’ rea-
soning concerns the experience of time slowing down itself. As a
sole explanation, the idea that time only appears to slow down
because of unusually rich memories means that subjects never
really experienced that time slowed down – it was all due to the
retrospective judgment of the duration of the event. Yet when
people report the mental state they had during accidents, it is the
experiences of time slowing down that they report. Indeed, in this
sense the memory account takes an antirealist position toward the
reported phenomenology.
Bridging the gap from rich memories to experiences of time
slowing down is a stretch, however, because when people make, to
use Stetson et al.’s expression, an erroneous interpretation of the
duration, the result is knowledge that time has slowed down, yet
not an experience of it as one would have it. It is however the expe-
riences of time slowing down that people report shortly after the
event, and hence what is lacking here is an account how knowledge
can turn into an experience of past episodes. For what it is worth, it
can be asked further, what might be the evolutionary value of such
mechanism that alters our memories after the life-threatening sit-
uations over the mechanism that speeds our thoughts and actions
during those situations?
HOW TO EXPLAIN THE EXPERIENCES DURING ACCIDENTS?
The discussion of the previous two explanations for the reports of
time slowing down emphasizes the fact that the reported phenom-
enology during frightening, sudden accidents as a whole needs to
be taken seriously. Indeed, not only must one explain the phenom-
enology directly related to time slowing down (as the ﬁrst expla-
nation aimed to do) but also subjects’ reports of vivid thoughts
and unusually sharp vision and hearing (which thememory effects
could partly explain). Nonetheless, neither explanation accounted
for all the listed features of the distorted phenomenology.
The explanation for the altered temporal phenomenology that
is argued for in this section accounts for thewhole alteredphenom-
enology and how somepeople can have acted fast and purposefully
during the sudden, life-threatening situations. Arguably this has
an advantage over the previously discussed proposal because it
does justice to peoples’ reports. The motivation of the explanation
comes from Noyes and Kletti’s idea that the experienced increased
speed of thought and slowed down external time are interrelated –
the relation between the temporal properties of events in the
external world and in internal states is distorted. As time in the
real world does not really slow down during accidents, it is the
internal processes that are somehow altered. Consequently, to go
over the main points brieﬂy, the explanation has two parts. First, a
mechanism is suggested that explains how our cognitive processes
could become faster during the sudden and frightening experi-
ences. This will simultaneously account the non-temporal features
of such experiences, such as altered attention and heightened per-
ception. The previous does not yet explain the altered temporal
phenomenology however. Even if our cognitive processes would
be faster, that does not yetmean that our cognitive processes would
appear to be unusually fast, or that we would have experiences of
time slowing down and feelings that the event lasted longer than it
actually did.Accordingly, the secondpart focuses onhowour inter-
nal processes being faster can lead to such altered phenomenology
in suitable situations.
To begin with, the mechanism that could account for our expe-
riences during the sudden life-threatening situations needs to ful-
ﬁll at minimum the following requirements: the mechanism needs
to become active in such situations, it needs to activate fast, and
it must have wide-ranging effects. The neuronal mechanism that
fulﬁlls these requirements is the locus coeruleus norepinephrine
system, the main source of the neurotransmitter norepinephrine.
The ﬁrst thing to note about it is that it is (in addition to other
things) part of a ﬁght-or-ﬂight response that humans and other
primates have been postulated to exhibit. This response is trig-
gered by a perception of a fearful and threatening situation, not
threatening situations per se, and hence it is likely to play a role
in the situations under discussion. Second, the phasic response
(brief and high levels of discharge) of locus coeruleus norepi-
nephrine system to highly salient as well as task-relevant stimuli
occurs with a short latency of 100–150ms and actually precedes
behavior (Aston-Jones et al., 1994, 1997). Thus such activation is
in accord with the fact that many accidents, like car accidents, last
only a few seconds during which the effects could occur. Finally,
given that noradrenergic neurons originating from locus coeruleus
project exceptionally widely in the brain, the entire cerebral cortex
for instance receives input from it, and that norepinephrine is one
of the main neurotransmitters, it is unsurprising that the effects
of released norepinephrine can be dramatic and wide-ranging
(Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003).
As regards the function and effects of the activation of locus
coeruleus and noradrenergic neurons that originate from it and
release norepinephrine, converging evidence nowadays suggest
that this system plays a complex role of “mediating shifts in atten-
tion and in promoting optimal behavioral performance” (Sara,
2009, p. 220). In more detail, the most important effects of locus
coeruleus norepinephrine system for the topic at hand are the fol-
lowing. First, the increase of norepinephrine has the result that our
attentionbecomesmore focused (Berridge andWaterhouse,2003),
the shifting of attention to new targets is facilitated (Aston-Jones
andCohen, 2005;Yu andDayan, 2005), and the functional integra-
tion of brain systems related to attentional tasks improved (Coull
et al., 1999). Second, the increase also facilitates our working-
memory performance (Arnsten et al., 1996; Ramos and Arnsten,
2007), task-related decision processes, and associated behavioral
responses by increasing speed and accuracy of responses (Clayton
et al., 2004; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Grefkes et al., 2010),
and speeding up our behavioral adaptation to the environment
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(Devauges and Sara, 1990; Bouret and Sara, 2005). In addition, our
clarity of thoughts possibly improves (Berridge and Waterhouse,
2003). Finally, with the increase of norepinephrine our sensitiv-
ity to sensory surrounds becomes enhanced and our perception
is affected as neurons respond to stimuli faster and more accu-
rately than in usual conditions (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003;
Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). Note that this does not mean that
the temporal resolution of perception would improve, just that
when a new stimulus appears, it is processed in less time than
it would under normal situations. Altogether, the previous effects
mean that the activation of locus coeruleus norepinephrine system
speeds up our internal processes concerning the relevant features
of the situation at hand and subsequently improves our behavioral
responses to the environment.
In short, there is a well-established neurophysiological system
that can be seen to play a role in the experiences that are under dis-
cussion. To begin with, its activity increases during the situations
that are perceived to be threatening and it can exert its effects very
rapidly. In addition, many of its known effects are in good accor-
dance with the phenomenology discussed in the second section
(namely heightened perception, altered attention). That is, this
system provides a realist explanation for the non-temporal fea-
tures of the phenomenology related to experiences we have been
discussing. Given that it is plausible to think that such a system
is in play here, there are good reasons to accept one of the con-
sequences that this brings along: our cognitive processes, such
as thinking and shift of attention, are facilitated and accordingly
indeed our thought is faster during accidents where the system is
activated. This is also in good accordance with the fact that the
rate of our information processing can be speeded up by rather
simple means. For example, the performance of participants is
improved in many psychophysical experiments where the time is a
crucial factor (such reporting as many letters as possible in a Sper-
ling experiment) when this task is preceded by a train of sounds
(clicks) for 5 s (Jones et al., 2011).
However, it is important to notice that even if our cognitive
processes were faster, it does not yet mean that we have an expe-
rience that we are unusually fast. Likewise, although our duration
estimations are likely to tend toward overestimation as a result of
increased arousal, it does not follow yet that we have the phenom-
enology related to time slowing down. As an analogy, consider an
amateur runner who is running on a new route and knows her
heart rate. If the heart rate is exceptionally high, it could mean
two things. On the one hand, she might be running exceptionally
fast. On the other hand, she might be running roughly at her nor-
mal speed but she is not in the running condition she expected to
be. That is, the high heart rate does not translate into the faster
running speed without some additional information, such as the
distance she has covered in certain time. Hence, what is missing is
an explanation for why faster thought amounts to the experiences
that we have ample time to perceive, attend, act, or whatever we
are doing. Why do we feel ourselves being faster?
Theoretically it appears obvious that we cannot have an experi-
ence that we are somehow faster or slower if we do not have some
kind of a criterion for normal “speed.” Think, for instance, that
one perceives for the ﬁrst time a robot “dancing” (i.e., turning)
champagne bottles in a winery. It is plausible to assume that in
this case she does not have any idea of the pace at which this task is
typically done, and accordingly it is impossible to say whether the
robot does the task at normal speed or unusually fast or slow. The
same holds for the experience that our thoughts are faster than
usual. Without a background feeling about the “normal” rate of
events unfolding in our awareness, we simply cannot know if the
rate at which things unfold in a current situation is unusual or not.
Indeed, the existence of some kind of criterion or background feel-
ing of the normal speed appears theoretically necessary to explain
the experiences we have been discussing.
The relevant question is, of course, what constitutes the sense
of normal speed of things that we have been discussing. One
suggestion can be found in William Goody’s description of a
patient, whose movements became unusually slow due to Parkin-
son’s disease. After inquiring about the slowness of the patient’s
movements, Goody got the reply that “My own movements. . .
seem normal unless I see how long they take by looking at a clock.
The clock on the wall of the ward seems to be going exception-
ally fast (as reported in Sacks, 2004).”While this quotation makes
explicit the idea that we have a sense of the normal rate of passage
of time, it also suggests that things external to us have an impor-
tant role in determining the criterion – without the knowledge of
the temporal relation between his movements and their real dura-
tion, the patient would not have had experiences of his movements
being unusually slow.
Our speeded internal processes, due to an increased norepi-
nephrine level, do not yet amount to the experience that we are
faster – the speed of our thoughts can simply feel normal. How-
ever,when our actions are directed to the external world, they have
the same kind of reference as Goody’s patient had and we notice
that we are unusually fast. For example, we might notice that we
can shift our attention from one stimulus to another faster than
normally. Thismeans that thingsmove less in theworld during our
shifts of attention than usual. Likewise, even if our actions them-
selves do not necessarily speed up much (after all, this is largely
due to our muscles, not cortex), our actions could initiate unusu-
ally fast due to increased alertness and speed of decision making,
both of which associated have been associated with higher levels
of norepinephrine. In this situation, our sensory and re-afferent
systems provide us with grounds to feel that somehow our internal
processes are faster than usual. Indeed, it has been shown that the
feedback of re-afferent systems plays an important role in deter-
mining the time in which we perceive our actions to occur (Obhi
et al., 2009).
The support for the existence of the sense of normal speed that
time passes is not only anecdotal, since our expectancies of the
normal temporal course of our actions and their consequences
become adapted to the prevailing circumstances. For example,
when subjects press a key that results in a ﬂash, and a short arti-
ﬁcial ﬁxed delay is introduced by the researchers, subjects adapt
to this delay so that for them the ﬂash appears at the same time
as they press the key. This effect was most noticeable when the
delay was removed (and the subjects have not adapted to the new
situation yet), because in these situations subjects report that the
ﬂash appears before they press the key (Stetson et al., 2006).
If generalized, Stetson et al.’s “keypress-and-ﬂash” experiment
shows that we have (unconscious) expectations of the normal
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temporal relations between our decisions and actions (here press-
ing the key) and their consequences (ﬂash occurs). Our motor,
perception, and cognitive systems become adapted to a certain
delay after which the consequences occur. This adaptation is inﬂu-
enced by the prevailing circumstances. The same thing can also be
seen in crossmodal simultaneity tasks, where subjects adapt to
the asynchrony of visual and auditory stimuli and thus do not
perceive them being asynchronous anymore (e.g., Fujisaki et al.,
2004; Zampini et al., 2005).
This example thus illustrates how there are expectations of
the normal delay between our actions and their consequences,
and suggests that there are similar expectancies pertaining other
actions as well whether they are concrete or mental. Accordingly,
we have some sense of how often and fast we can shift our atten-
tion from one thing to another, how fast we can react to things,
and so forth. This idea combined with the assumption that our
internal processes indeed are speeded brings about experiences
that we are faster than usual. Furthermore, because the sense of
rate at which time passes is determined by the speed of things in
the external world as compared to the speed of our abilities to
act according to those things, our feeling that we are somehow
faster than usual also amounts to the experience that things in the
external world happen slower than usual. That is, the temporal
features of the phenomenology described in the section two can
be accounted for.
One can object to this conclusion however by arguing that peo-
ple do not have experiences of the sense of normal speed of things.
While I agree that this is generally the case, it is important to notice
that the feeling of normal speed at which things occur is something
that need not be accessible to even the most perceptive introspec-
tion.Quite the contrary, it can be likened to the background feeling
of ownership of our body parts or thoughts. This is not something
thatwenormally feel, butwhen things gowrong,we do feel themas
illustrated by clinical cases (such as somatoparaphrenia, see Vallar
and Ronchi, 2009). Likewise, although we might not have an ever
present feeling of the normal speed of things, something like that
needs to be in the background for otherwise we could not notice
when things are somehow unusual as in the case of “keypress-
and-ﬂash” example or Goody’s patient noticing how much time
his movements take.
It is likewise unsuccessful to object to the current proposal
based on the claim that it makes unreasonably strong predic-
tions: when we drink coffee, our internal processes may become
faster than before, but still we do not feel that external time has
slowed down. The problem with this objection is that it ignores
the details of “keypress-and-ﬂash” experiment, which illustrates
the importance of fast changes in the time course in which events
unfold – because subjects adapt to the prevailing situations, we
can only notice the changes that occur faster than we can adapt
to the situation. When we drink coffee, the amount of caffeine
in our system grows gradually and our expectancies of the tem-
poral relations might change along with it. Hence, we do not
have the experiences of us being faster and things moving in slow
motion.
The provided explanation can also account for the fact peo-
ple experience time slowing down only in sudden and frightening
situations. First, the activity of a relevant ﬁght-or-ﬂight response
only increases in threatening situations. Second, the change in the
norepinephrine levels can either occur slowly or fast. Arguably the
experimental situation in Stetson et al.’s (2007) study was not par-
ticularly fast – people had to put on the harnesses, get up to the
tower where they were released, and wait for the release – and for
this reason they had plenty of time to adapt to the likely increase
in norepinephrine levels (and most probably also to increased
adrenalin levels).
Finally, attentional effects and the increased speed of our cog-
nitive processes suggest an alternative interpretation for the movie
analogy that Stetson and his colleagues used. To begin with, given
that attention is focused narrowly on the issues potentially rele-
vant for survival, these things are perceived more clearly. Second,
the shifts of attention are facilitated – we shift our attention from
one thing to another unusually fast. When these shifts of attention
are voluntary, they are known to cause the subjective expansion
of time and sometimes even a feeling that time appears to stand
still. Such feelings can occur in everyday situations when we, for
example, turn our attention to the second hand of the clock and
wait for it to jolt forward (Yarrow et al., 2001) or when, after
dialing a telephone call and shifting attention shortly to some-
thing else, we turn attention back to the telephone call and wait
to hear the next dialing tone (Hodinott-Hill et al., 2002). Com-
bined these two suggest that, in the right conditions, one could
have a succession of perceptions (following the shifts of our atten-
tion) where subjective time is expanded (and may even appear
to stand still) and that these perceptions would be focused and
well-scrutinized.
This line of reasoning lends itself to an interpretation of the
movie analogy where subjects do not perceive more snapshots
during the frightening events (as Stetson et al. hypothesized), but
they have the feeling that the snapshots they perceive last longer
than usual. It is not that there was an abundance of experiences,
but abundance of time to scrutinize the perceptions. Hence this
second interpretation proposes that there is no increase in the
“refresh rate” of perception, but that we have the feeling of having
more time to perceive things clearly than we normally do. Our
enhanced cognitive processing, which facilitates our apprehension
of things we perceive, also contributes toward having such feel-
ings. Again analogy helps to understand this idea: when a ﬁlm is
seen in a very slow motion, we have an abundant time to perceive
certain features in it. (For example, the question whether a gal-
loping horse has all its feet off the ground at the same time could
be determined only after Eadweard Muybridge produced a series
of still images of such horse in 1870s.). It is this second inter-
pretation that I think is the correct interpretation of the movie
analogy.
SUMMARY
When people are suddenly faced with situations that they per-
ceive as threatening, later they often report having had experiences
with unusual phenomenology. I argue here that the phenom-
enology should be taken as given and reported in its entirety.
This is because otherwise some of the most relevant phenom-
ena in these situations–such as how people can act in unusu-
ally fast and purposeful ways to save their lives–would be left
unaddressed.
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The provided explanation for the reported experiences can be
summarized as follows: the experiences of time slowing down
results from the fact that the relation between the temporal prop-
erties of events in the external world and internal states is sud-
denly (so that adaptation is yet to occur) distorted as result of
increased speed of internal processes. In more detail, the explana-
tion thus comes in two parts. First, it was suggested that cognitive
processes are enhanced during the sudden and frightening sit-
uations – we are unusually fast. The explanation on how this
could occur relied on the locus coeruleus norepinephrine sys-
tem whose activity increases in these situations. Signiﬁcantly, this
increased activity correlateswith enhanced cognitive processes and
its effects match non-temporal features of the reported phenome-
nology (e.g., altered attention and heightened perception). Given
that being faster does not equal the experience of being faster, this
provided only a partial explanation of the experience however. The
second part of the explanation for the experiences of time slowing
down focused on how our internal processes being faster can lead
to an altered temporal phenomenology in suitable situations – how
we can have the experience that we have ample time to perceive,
attend, and act. This was explained by arguing that we have a sense
of the normal speed of time passing and that this in turn depends
on the temporal relation of our actions and external events. Our
increased alertness, faster cognitive processes and initiation of
actions make us aware that the relation is changed with the result
that we have experiences with anomalous temporal characteristics.
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